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AFDC and Homicide
LANCE HANNON
The University of Connecticut
Department of Sociology
Conservatives generally believe that government largess has created a
morally defective welfare subculture. Some argue that excessive welfare
payments contribute to high homicide rates by undermining individual
responsibility and attachment to traditional social institutions. Liberals,
on the other hand, suggest that higher welfare benefits may reduce homicide
rates by alleviating the strains of poverty and promoting educational
achievement. Drawing on a review of literature and aggregate welfare data,
this study examined the relationship between local AFDC benefit levels and
homicide rates. Variables were derived from Department of Health and
Human Services, 1990 Census, and FBI data describing social/economic
areas (N=394). Controlling for several economic and demographic vari-
ables, higher AFDC payments were associated with lower homicide rates.
In addition, AFDC benefit level had an indirect negative effect on the
homicide rate via its negative association with the high school dropout rate.
Overall, these findings support the welfare-as-an-investment-in-youth and
integrated strain-disorganization perspectives.
Introduction
In response to the murder of a woman in November of 1995,
House Speaker Newt Gingrich declared, "Let's talk about what
the welfare state has created, let's talk about the moral decay of
the world the left is defending" (New York Times, 1995, p. 34A).
Several prominent conservative scholars have joined Gingrich in
arguing that high welfare guarantees lead to more social prob-
lems. These authors have suggested that welfare encourages de-
nial of responsibility among the poor and reduces attachment to
traditional social institutions (Wilson, 1995; Murray, 1984). Most
notably, Gilder (1981) has claimed that high welfare payments
Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare, December, 1997, Volume XXIV, Number 4
126 AFDC and Homicide
encourage the poor to withdraw from school and the legitimate
labor market by rewarding failure. Similarly, Rector (1992) has
argued that generous welfare payments increase 'behavioral pov-
erty', a term that includes both low levels of academic achieve-
ment and high levels of violent crime.
Liberal authors, on the other hand, have argued that higher
levels of support to poor families should reduce violent crime by
alleviating the personal strains of poverty and poverty induced
community disorganization (Davey, 1995; Sampson and Wilson,
1995; Cullen, 1994). Liberal policy advocates have recently em-
phasized a model that views welfare as an investment in youth
and education (Duncan, 1994; Butler, 1990). A long line of research
has shown that higher income is negatively associated with school
failure (Sherman, 1994). There has also been a substantial amount
of research demonstrating that school failure, especially dropping
out of high school, is strongly related to criminality (Gottfred-
son and Hirshi, 1990) and embeddedness in criminal networks
(Hagan and Peterson, 1995). Moreover, low income areas tend
to have high rates of both high school dropout and homicide.
Thus liberals generally suggest that welfare payment has a direct
negative effect on the homicide rate because it alleviates economic
tensions and an indirect negative effect because it also helps
reduce the dropout rate.
Previous Studies
Despite a considerable amount of research on the relation-
ship between poverty and homicide, only a few criminologists
have attempted to examine the potential moderating effects of
economic assistance to the poor. Using a sample of 1970 SMSAs
(n=39), DeFronzo (1983) reported that the cost of living adjusted
AFDC payment per person (Aid for Families with Dependent
Children) had a significant negative effect on the homicide rate.
Concerned with DeFronzo's small sample size, Messner (1986)
replicated DeFronzo's analysis using a much larger sample of
1980 SMSAs (n=292) and an unadjusted measure. Messner reaf-
firmed DeFronzo's conclusion that higher AFDC payments were
associated with lower urban homicide rates.
Taking a somewhat different approach, Rosenfeld (1986) ex-
amined the effects of state AFDC eligibility requirements on 1980
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SMSA homicide rates. Consistent with DeFronzo and Messner,
he found that benefit restrictiveness had a significant positive
effect on the homicide rate. However, he also reported a signif-
icant positive effect of the proportion of poor families receiving
public assistance. This finding offered some support for the con-
servative argument that increased welfare participation translates
into higher levels of social disorganization. Rosenfeld cautioned
aan ...uncondit-'a f ;, -t...-t of these finding noting
that alternative specifications were needed to clarify his results
(p. 122). Indeed, there were several potentially important omis-
sions from his model. While he noted that his measure of welfare
participation was a measure of "dependency and not simply a
redundant measure of poverty" (p. 121), Rosenfeld did not in-
clude a measure of poverty with which this variable would be
redundant. Moreover, Rosenfeld did not control for the percent
of female headed families in an area. This variable is often in-
terpreted solely as a measure of community social control, but
it could also be seen as reflecting a particular type (or outcome)
of poverty (Wilson, 1987; Sampson and Wilson, 1995). Compared
to their married family counterparts, female headed families are
much more likely to have extremely low incomes and to live in
the poorest of areas (Sidel, 1996). The percent of female headed
families generally has a strong positive effect on urban homicide
rates and is significantly correlated with welfare participation
rates (Sampson, 1987).
In a study of large cities in 1980, Sampson (1987) found that
both the percent of black families receiving public assistance and
the mean public assistance payment per black family had signif-
icant negative effects on the black homicide rate. These effects
were independent of the percent of black families in poverty and
percent of black families that were female headed. The discrep-
ancy between the Rosenfeld and Sampson findings may be due
to the lack of statistical control for poverty and family structure
in Rosenfeld's analysis.
Using national crime rate data for 1948-1985, Devine, Sheley
and Smith (1988) reported a negative but statistically insignificant
relationship between total welfare spending and the homicide
rate. Like Rosenfeld, these authors did not include family struc-
ture in their analysis. In a longitudinal and cross-national study
that controlled for changes in family dissolution, Gartner (1990)
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found significant negative effects of total welfare spending on
age specific homicide rates. These effects were particularly pro-
nounced for child homicide. In a somewhat more comprehen-
sive study, Briggs and Cutright (1994) also reported significant
negative effects of total public assistance expenditures on child
homicide rates.
Zimmerman's (1995, 1987) studies of a related form of lethal
violence, suicide, showed that higher state social welfare expen-
ditures were associated with substantially lower suicide rates.
Controlling for several economic and demographic variables, she
found that welfare expenditures explained the variation in state
suicide rates between 1985 and 1990 better than any other measure
(1995).
This study adds to previous research on welfare and violence
in several ways. First, I use local labor markets as my units of
analysis. These are social and economic areas that cover the entire
50 states and the District of Columbia. Thus unlike previous
research, I include non-metropolitan areas in my analysis. This is
an important addition considering that recent criminological re-
search at the county level has demonstrated that homicide in rural
areas is much more common than generally believed. Kposowa
and Breault (1993, p. 40) have noted that of the top 30 homicide
rates in 1980,23 were in counties with populations below 20,000.
Second, this study examines the links between welfare assistance,
dropping out of school, and homicide rates. Previous studies that
included the dropout rate have generally used it in an index
of poverty where the unique effects of the dropout rate were
masked. Given the consistently high percentage of violent felons
who have dropped out of high school and the contemporary
importance of the education versus prisons debate (Davey, 1995),
dropout rates deserve singular attention. Moreover, considering
the current significance of the welfare-as-an-investment-in-youth
model (Sherman, 1994), this study will test for an indirect effect
of AFDC payment on the homicide rate via AFDC's effect on the
dropout rate.
Data, Variables and Method
This analysis used Tolbert and Killian's (1997) delineation of
394 labor market areas (LMA's) for the United States. LMAs are
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quite simply the areas in which most people both live and work.
Similar to MSAs, LMAs were designed to be social/economic
areas and are well suited for studying the relationship between
economic factors and crime. Unlike MSAs however, these defini-
tions were not based on an urban center but instead rely solely
on commuter flows. Based on 1990 census journey-to-work data,
these areas were constructed with elaborate matrices of commut-
;-nc, ficsc nmnnc cyrnii",_ n TI 0, e-%-1nf-OC iiCh" iIri14orf
LMAs do not begin with a central place assumption and are not
constrained by state boundaries. Thus LMAs are social rather
than political units. The fact that LMAs contain component data
from different states helps reduce the amount of spatial auto-
correlation in the equations. This is especially important given
that most of the variation in AFDC payments is among states
rather than among counties. Compared to research utilizing SM-
SAs, which generally do not cross state lines, LMA definitions
increase the total amount of variation in local AFDC payments
and lessen the bias toward states containing more metropolitan
areas.
Nineteen-ninety census data from USA-Counties-1996 were
aggregated to produce most of the LMA variables used in this
analysis (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1996). The homicide
rate was derived from the Uniform Crime Reports 1989-19901
(Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1990, 1991). State AFDC benefit
levels were obtained from the Department of Health and Human
Services (1992). The mode of aggregation of county data varied
depending on the specific measure: counts were summed, while
means and percentages were disaggregated, summed, and reag-
gregated.
The dependent variable for this analysis was the number of
homicides per 100,000 persons in the average population between
1989 and 1990. Because homicide rates may be somewhat unsta-
ble, the homicide data were averaged over two years-1989 and
1990. The intervening variable was the percent of 16-19 year olds
who were not enrolled in school and had not completed high
school in 1990. This measure is commonly referred to as a 'status
dropout rate' (U.S. Department of Education, 1990).
A key component variable for this study was the average
monthly AFDC payment per recipient in 1990. I chose this
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measure over the average welfare payment per family (used by
Sampson) to minimize the confounding effects of local differences
in average family size. AFDC is the largest and most heavily
debated form of government income assistance to the poor. Pay-
ment levels are set by individual states and vary substantially.
Mississippi had the lowest 1990 monthly payment per person
($40), while Alaska had the highest ($245).
Since areas vary in cost of living, an adjustment seemed ap-
propriate to specify the relative worth of each AFDC payment.
I created an adjusted AFDC payment measure using the local
median gross rent in 1990 as a proxy for cost of living. The adjusted
AFDC variable was derived by dividing the average local AFDC
payment per person by a cost of living ratio (local median gross
rent / national median gross rent). Gross monthly rent consists
of the contract rent plus the estimated costs of utilities when
not already included in the contract rent. Housing costs (espe-
cially rent costs) are particularly relevant for low income groups.
These expenses generally consume a much larger portion of poor
people's revenue than that of their middle income counterparts
(Wright, 1989). The overwhelming majority of poor households
(70-75 %) are without any housing subsidy (1989). While the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development recommends
that a household should spend no more than 25 % of its income on
housing, about one quarter of all poor households typically report
spending over 70% of their income on rent (1989). Consistent
with DeFronzo's (1983) study, the adjusted and unadjusted AFDC
measures were highly correlated (r=.80) and the adjusted variable
had a somewhat stronger association with the homicide rate.
Other variables were: the percent of families that were female
headed, the unemployment rate, the percent of persons in poverty
(in 1989), the percent of the population between the ages of 16 and
29, population size and the percent of the population designated
as urban by the U.S. Census Bureau. An exploration of vari-
ous possible non-linear relationships resulted in the logarithmic
transformation of population size to better suit the assumptions of
regression. I then created an index of urbanism by combining the
natural log of the total LMA population in 1990 and the percent of
the population designated as urban (following Cao and Maume,
1993).
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I used Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression to estimate
the equations. None of the bivariate correlations between the
independent variables were above .65 and none of the variance
inflation factors (VIFs) were above 4.0. Thus, the equations did
not appear to suffer from excessive multicollinearity (Fox, 1991).
Results
An analysis of the bivariate correlations of the variables in-
cluded in Models 1 and 2 (Table 1) revealed that the cost of living
adjusted AFDC payment, dropout rate and percent of female
headed families were all strongly associated with the homicide
rate (r=-.53, r=.54, r= .61 respectively). Additionally, the unem-
ployment rate, degree of urbanism and percent of the population
in poverty had moderately strong correlations with the homicide
rate (r=.28, r=.29 and r=.40 respectively). In the first multivariate
equation (Model 1), the net effects of the percent of female headed
families (BETA=.37, p<.001), the percent of the population in
poverty (BETA=.25, p<.001) and degree of urbanism (BETA=.20,
p<.001) were all substantial. Consistent with DeFronzo's (1983)
and Messner's (1986) findings, the cost of living adjusted AFDC
payment per person had a significant negative net effect on the
homicide rate (BETA=-.31, p<.001).
Table 1
Effects on 1990 LMA Homicide Rates (N=394) (Standardized
Regression Coefficients Reported)
Structural Covariates Model I Model 2
% of Families Female Headed .37** .34**
% of Persons in Poverty .25** .25**
Unemployment Rate .01 -. 06
Urbanism Index .20** .21*
% of the Population 16-29 -. 10* -. 04
Adjusted AFDC Payment -. 31** -. 17*
% among Ages 16-19 HS Dropouts - .28**
(two tailed) Adj. R 2  .52 .57
* P< .05
** P<.001
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Model 2 shows the same equation with the addition of the
dropout rate. The adjusted R2 increased from .52 to .57. The
dropout rate had a relatively large positive net effect on the homi-
cide rate (BETA=.28, p<.001). The net effect of the unemployment
rate remained statistically insignificant. The previous slight effect
of the percentage of the population between the ages of 16 and
29 was rendered insignificant. The net effects for the percent of
female headed families, degree of urbanism, and percent of the
population in poverty remained essentially the same, while the
net effect of the cost of living adjusted AFDC payment was greatly
reduced by the inclusion of the dropout variable (BETA 1=-.31,
BETA 2=-.17). About forty-five percent of AFDC payment's effect
on the homicide rate was due to its negative association with the
dropout rate. The bivariate correlation between the cost of living
adjusted AFDC payment and the dropout rate was negative and
substantial (r=-.48).
Table 2 compares the means of LMA homicide rates for three
intervals of the cost of living adjusted AFDC payment. The aver-
age homicide rate for all LMAs was 6.4. AFDC intervals were
selected to divide the sample in approximate thirds. The ob-
served means are accompanied by means adjusted for the effects
of the covariates: percent of female headed families, percent of
the population in poverty, unemployment rate, urbanism index,
and percent of the population between the ages of 16 and 29.
Table 2
Analysis of Variance of 1990 LMA Homicide Rates By AFDC Intervals
Observed Means Means Adjusted for
Cost of Living Adjusted Covariates
Average AFDC Monthly
Payment Per Person Homicide Rate** Homicide Rate** N
Less than $102 9.5 8.1 131
$102 to $138 6.4 6.5 132
More than $138 3.4 4.7 131
394
**p < .001
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The dropout rate was excluded from the equation so that the
indirect as well as direct association between AFDC and the
homicide rate would be reflected in the differences among the
adjusted means. The mean homicide rate adjusted for the ef-
fects of the control variables was 42% lower for areas in the
top third of AFDC payments (4.7) than for areas in the bottom
third (8.1).
An alrntv speifcaio thtrplcdte percent of al
families that were female headed with the percent of all families
that were both poor and female headed revealed nearly identical
results. The bivariate correlation between these variables was
.84. Similar results were also obtained when the percent black
was substituted for the percent of female headed families. The
bivariate correlation was .76.
In other supplemental analyses, I created a dummy variable
for southern location. Southern location was negatively associ-
ated with the cost of living adjusted AFDC payment (r=-.51) and
positively associated with the dropout rate (r=.47). As in Mess-
ner's (1986) study of SMSAs, despite relatively high collinearity,
the net effect of AFDC payment on the homicide rate remained
significant. More important, when the southern LMAs were re-
moved from the sample, AFDC payment's effects on the homicide
and dropout rates were nearly identical to those identified in the
full analysis. However, these results must be interpreted with
caution given the limited variance in the regional subsample.
I also tested for a potential indirect effect of the average wel-
fare payment on the homicide rate via welfare payment's relation-
ship to the prevalence of female headed families. As in previous
studies (Blank, 1995; Moffitt, 1992), I found no support for the
hypothesis that higher AFDC payments were strongly associated
with more female headed families. In fact, controlling for the other
variables in the homicide equation, the cost of living adjusted
AFDC payment was negatively associated with the percent of all
families that were female headed.
Finally, a supplemental analysis using 1980 data revealed very
similar results. Controlling for other factors, the cost of living
adjusted AFDC payment had a direct negative effect on 1980 LMA
homicide rates (N=382) and a substantial indirect negative effect
through the status dropout rate.
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Conclusion
Conservatives implicate excessively generous government
policies as partly responsible for high homicide rates. The find-
ings of this analysis suggest that conservative proposals to limit
AFDC benefits should not be legitimated as a means to reduce
extreme violence. Instead, the results support the welfare-as-an-
investment-in-youth and integrated strain-disorganization per-
spectives. Higher welfare payments were associated with lower
dropout and homicide rates. The significant negative effect of the
cost of living adjusted AFDC payment per person on the homicide
rate is consistent with research using SMSAs. As Currie points
out, it is probably not coincidental that among developed coun-
tries "the United States is afflicted simultaneously with the worst
rates of violent crime, the widest spread in income inequality,
and the most severe public policies toward the disadvantaged"
(1985, p. 171). The nation's current priorities are reducing violent
crime and cutting back on welfare expenditures. Unfortunately,
it seems the costs of poverty must be paid in one form or another.
Note
1. The data and tabulations utilized in this paper were made available (in
part) by the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research.
The data for the Uniform Crime Reports were originally collected by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice. Neither the
collector of the original data nor the Consortium bear any responsibility
for the analyses or interpretations presented within.
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